When 9/11 exposed the holes in American
airport and airline security, the Bush administration and Congress
responded with the usual Washington panacea: a new federal agency.
Congress quickly deluged the new Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) with billions of dollars to hire an army of over 50,000 federal
agents to screen airport passengers and baggage.
But before the agency was even a year
old, it was clear that it had "become a monster," to quote the chairman
of the House Aviation Subcommittee, John Mica (R-Fla.). Arrogant,
abusive, incompetent, and expensive, the TSA is, in the words of the
House Appropriations Committee, "seemingly unable to make crisp
decisions...unable to work cooperatively with the nation痴
airports; and unable to take advantage of the multitude of
security-improving and labor-saving technologies available."
The attacks of September 11, 2001,
changed many things, but they did not make the federal government more
competent or effective, and they did not make it more willing to
respect the dignity or liberty of its citizens. For proof, one need
only examine the TSA痴 sorry record.
Jumpy Screeners
In June 2002 news leaked out that TSA
airport screeners missed 24 percent of the weapons and imitation bombs
planted in the government痴 undercover security tests. At some
major airports, screeners failed to detect potentially dangerous
objects in half the tests. The results were worse than they first
appeared, because the testers were ordered not to "artfully
conceal" the deadly contraband and instead pack their luggage
"consistent with how a typical passenger in air transportation might
pack a bag." Although the tests seemed designed to see if screeners
could catch terrorists with single-digit IQs, they still failed to find
the weapons much of the time.
That does not mean TSA screeners
don稚 find anything. Notable triumphs have included seizing a
tiny pair of wire cutters from a Special Forces veteran who had been
shot in the jaw in Afghanistan and needed the cutters to snip his jaw
open if he started to choke; evacuating terminals in Los Angeles upon
discovering that travelers were carrying such dangerous devices as a
belt buckle or a tub of jam; and shutting down several concourses in
St. Louis after a federal security screener spotted what appeared to be
a "cutting tool" in a carry-on bag. After detecting the suspicious
object, the St. Louis screener followed proper procedure: He fetched
his supervisor to take a look at the frozen image on the video screen
at the checkpoint. A few minutes later, the supervisor concluded that
the bag was indeed suspicious and needed to be manually searched. But
the passenger had long since retrieved it and headed to his or her
flight. Hundreds of passengers were evacuated and up to 60 flights were
delayed; despite many searches, the suspicious item was never found.
On January 15, 2003, the Tampa airport
was evacuated after screeners discovered an abandoned briefcase that
appeared to be packed with bombs. The ticketing level of the terminal
was cleared, the roads outside were closed,
and the bomb squad arrived. An hour later, it was determined that the
briefcase was a TSA dummy designed to test airport security. "We use
these bags repeatedly, so the fact that the bag was in that area was
not surprising," TSA Security Director Dario Compain told the St.
Petersburg Times. "That it was unattended, that there was no one
with it who knew its true nature and could stop the escalation of our
action before it reached the evacuation stage, is what痴
troubling."
The TSA detains more than just packages.
More than 1,000 people have been arrested at airport checkpoints since
the feds took over security in February 2002. A regulation passed that
month made it a federal crime to interfere with airport screening
personnel. A single word can be sufficient to trigger an arrest.
Betsylew Miale-Gix, a 43-year-old
personal injury lawyer and former world boomerang record holder, was
stopped at a security checkpoint at Hartford痴 Bradley
International Airport on June 30, 2002, and informed that she could not
carry her boomerangs onto the plane. The boomerangs weighed less than
three ounces each and were fragile -- the type of item that is
routinely crushed if sent as checked luggage. Miale-Gix had flown many
times after 9/11 and had never encountered any objections to her
boomerangs. They wouldn稚 be much use as weapons, after all; as
one of her fellow boomerang enthusiasts commented, throwing a
competitive boomerang at someone is "like throwing a first-class
letter."
The state trooper who banned the
boomerangs from the flight refused to listen to Miale-Gix痴
explanation, and she swore at him as she was departing the screening
area. She was quickly arrested, handcuffed, charged with breach of the
peace, and compelled to pay $500 for bail. TSA spokeswoman Deirdre
O担ullivan told The New York Times that although
boomerangs are not on the official list of prohibited carry-on items,
"the screeners have the discretion to decide whether or not that item
could be used as a weapon."
Travelers who assert their legal rights
can find themselves bounced. Della Maricich was banned from a
Portland-to-Seattle flight on May 1, 2002, after she asked an airport
screener to keep her purse where she could see it while he searched it.
(Many airport screeners have been accused of theft since the new search
procedures were introduced.) The screener refused, and Maricich
demanded to speak to his supervisor. A National Guardsman arrived on
the scene a few minutes later and, Maricich later told The Wall
Street Journal, "He told me that because I had disrupted the line
by calling for a supervisor, I would not be allowed to fly out of PDX
that day. He told me that I was a troublemaker and I was the only one
who had ever complained."
On August 2, 2002, a screener at
Hartford痴 Bradley International Airport poked through the wallet
of Fred Hubbell, an 80-year-old World War II combat veteran who had
already undergone two full searches in that airport that morning. "What
do you expect to find in there, a rifle?" the exasperated Hubbell
asked. He was then arrested for "causing a public disturbance" and
fined $78. Dana Cosgrove, the TSA airport security chief, later
justified the arrest on the grounds that "all that the people around
him in the waiting room heard was the word rifle."
The TSA flaunts its power to bar people
from flights. A group of 20 high school students and Catholic priests
and nuns, members of Peace Action Milwaukee, were detained at
Milwaukee痴 airport on April 19, 2002, after some of their names
turned up on a "No Fly Watch List" issued by the federal government.
According to one member of the group, a sheriff痴 deputy told
her, "You池e probably being stopped because you are a peace group
and you池e protesting against your country." Many of the
travelers missed their flights and had to fly the following day. Yet
Sgt. Chuck Coughlin of the Milwaukee sheriff痴 department
insisted, "Although it was time-consuming, and although they were
flight-delayed, the system actually worked."
The TSA痴 no-fly lists are often
poor sources of information. Many travelers are repeatedly stopped
erroneously and taken aside for intensive questioning, regardless of
how many times they have previously proved that they are not a threat
to national security. As David Sobel, general counsel of the Electronic
Privacy Information Center, told the Financial Times, "Nobody
wants to accept responsibility for the maintenance of the [no-fly]
list, and nobody wants to claim the authority to remove a name." Now
the TSA, at Congress痴 behest, is creating the Computer Assisted
Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS II), which will assign a "threat
level" to every person who flies within the United States. The TSA has
provided almost no information on how the system will operate, although
the government has indicated that it could sweep up a vast amount of
personal information on each traveler -- including credit history,
financial and transaction records, Internet usage, and legal records
(including speeding and parking tickets).
In January 2003 the TSA revealed a new
regulation allowing it to suspend pilot licenses based on unproven
suspicions that the pilot might pose a security risk. Those who lose
their livelihoods as a result of such edicts will not necessarily be
permitted to see the evidence against them. The TSA did not seek
comments from the public before announcing its new rule, which fails
even to define "security risk." Phil Boyer, president of the Aircraft
Owners and Pilots Association, protested that the TSA was being "the
cop, prosecutor, judge, jury and appeals court....Clearly, this is a
violation of basic constitutional rights." But agency spokesman Brian
Turmail dismissed the concerns: "The bottom line is: If you池e
not a terrorist, you don稚 need to worry about this."
Crazy Cops
The TSA has proven inept in the air as
well as on the ground. It was determined to expand the number of air
marshals quickly from a few hundred to more than 6,000. When most of
the applicants failed the marksmanship test, the agency solved that
problem by dropping the marksmanship test for new applicants. (The
ability to shoot accurately in a plane cabin is widely considered a
crucial part of a marshal痴 job.) Some would-be marshals were
hired even after they repeatedly shot flight attendants in mock hijack
response exercises.
USA Today痴 Blake Morrison
noted a report that "one marshal was suspended after he left his gun in
a lavatory aboard a United Airlines flight from Washington to Las Vegas
in December. A passenger discovered the weapon." Another air marshal
left his pistol on a Northwest flight from Detroit to Indianapolis; a
cleaning crew discovered the weapon. Morrison noted: "At least 250
federal air marshals have left the top-secret program, and documents
obtained by USA Today suggest officials are struggling to
handle what two managers call a flood of resignations."
The Transportation Department responded
to the USA Today exposé by sending Secretary Norman
Mineta to an air marshal training facility, where he witnessed a
training exercise in which marshals shot a would-be hijacker. Afterward
Mineta commented, "I not only saw a remarkable demonstration of skill
and marksmanship, but a degree of professionalism we are instilling
throughout our aviation security system."
Eight days later, on August 31, 2002,
Delta Flight 442 was proceeding from Atlanta to Philadelphia with 183
people on board when a disheveled passenger began rummaging in the
overhead bin. The Philadelphia Inquirer reported that
the trouble began when the man "made inappropriate comments to a female
passenger a few rows behind him." Two plainclothes air marshals jumped
up and tackled the guy, shoving him first to the back of the plane and
then dragging him to the first class area.
Then the trip got interesting. One of
the marshals returned to the front of the coach section, drew his Glock
semiautomatic pistol, and started screaming and pointing his gun at
passengers. Philadelphia Judge James Lineberger, a passenger on the
flight, later told the Associated Press, "I assumed at that moment that
there was going to be some sort of gun battle....There were individuals
looking to see what they were pointing at, and [the air marshals] were
yelling, 賎et down, get out -- get your head out of the
aisle.・瘢雹quot; In a formal complaint to the TSA, Lineberger
declared that "there was no apparent reason for holding all the
passengers of the plane at gunpoint, and no explanation was given."
Lineberger was sitting diagonally across
from the initial target of the marshals, yet did not notice any problem
on the flight until the marshals went ballistic. Susan Johnson, a
social worker from Mobile, Alabama, was also unaware of any disturbance
until the air marshals seized the man. "It never made sense," she told
the Inquirer. "This guy was not any physical threat that we
could see. Maybe he said some things to them that made them concerned.
He just appeared to us unstable, emotionally." According to Becky
Johnson, a reporter who wrote a column about the episode for her
Waynesville, North Carolina, newspaper, "They never, ever said who they
were, that they were air marshals or whoever."
After the flight landed, the marshals
nailed another terrorist suspect: a physician and retired U.S. Army
major named Robert Rajcoomar. He was handcuffed and taken into custody
because, as TSA spokesman David Steigman later explained it, he "had
been observing too closely."
Rajcoomar had been sitting in first class quietly reading and drinking
a beer until the marshals dumped the allegedly unruly passenger from
coach class into the adjacent seat. Rajcoomar told the Inquirer:
"One [marshal] sat on
the guy....he was groaning, and the more he groaned, the more they
twisted the handcuffs." Rajcoomar asked the stewardess for permission
to move to another seat in first class; she told him to take one of the
seats the marshals
had vacated.
When the plane landed, Rajcoomar
recalled, "One of these marshals came down to me and said, 践ead
down, hands over your head!・瘢雹They pushed my head down, told
me to bend down." Rajcoomar said one of the marshals told him, "We
didn稚 like the way you looked" and "We didn稚 like the way
you looked at us." He was locked up in a filthy cell for three hours
before being released without charges. His wife was left to roam the
Philadelphia airport, not knowing what had happened to her husband.
And the person who initially set off the
marshals? He was questioned after the plane landed, but a U.S. attorney
decided not to file charges.
The air marshal who brandished his
weapon had twice applied to be a cop in Philadelphia but failed the
police department痴 psychological tests. He had also been
rejected in an attempt to become a prison guard. When he threatened
scores of coach passengers, he had received only two weeks of training.
What escalates this episode beyond a
mere bizarre anecdote is the fact that the TSA hailed these marshals as
models. Several days after the incident, Thomas Quinn,
the national director of the air marshal program, asserted, "The
federal air marshals did a very good job. They did exactly as
they池e trained to do." And TSA spokesman Robert Johnson,
speaking to the Associated Press, blamed the passengers for being held
at gunpoint: "If people would have stayed in their seats and heeded
those warnings, that would not have happened. It痴 our opinion
that it was done by the book."
Not Just Birth Pangs
Dallas芳ort Worth International
Airport is home to 1,800 TSA screeners. At 1:50 p.m. on January 9,
2003, one of them swabbed the outside of a passenger痴 laptop bag
to check for explosives. The screener returned the bag to the
pas-senger, who proceeded to his plane. Three minutes later, the
screener noticed that the explosive trace detection machine indicated a
positive alert for Semtex, a plastic explosive, from the laptop. The
screeners then spent three more minutes checking the machine to confirm
the accuracy of the positive alert before they informed a TSA
supervisor of the problem. The supervisor and screeners then left the
checkpoint to walk around and see if they could find the man suspected
of having plastic explosives in his laptop. (The explosive detection
test is notorious for false positives.)
The group searched four airport
departure gates and, after they could not find the man, returned to the
checkpoint to retest the machine. More than half an hour after the
positive alert for plastic explosives occurred, the TSA notified an
airport policeman standing 15 feet from the checkpoint of the problem.
Orders were quickly given to empty the terminal. Almost an hour after
the laptop owner passed through the checkpoint, his description was
circulated through the airport.
Three terminals at the nation痴
third-largest airport were closed for almost two hours. Thousands of
people were evacuated from the airport and at least 200 flights
delayed. Hundreds of passengers already on planes waiting for takeoff
were obliged to deplane. Forty other airports were affected.
Because the Dallas芳ort Worth
airport was not blown up that afternoon, the TSA declared victory.
Agency spokesman Ed Martelle told the Fort Worth Star-Telegram:
"We caught him, but we lost him. But what he couldn稚 do was harm
anyone. The system worked." The TSA refused to name either the
manufacturer of the machine that gave the alert or the screener; as
spokesman Brian Doyle explained, "There are privacy issues involved
here." After prying into tens of millions of Americans・瘢雹bags,
the agency suddenly developed respect for privacy -- for itself and its
corporate suppliers.
Although the TSA promised to issue a
full report on the incident, it reneged, announcing a few weeks later
that national security concerns prevented it from releasing any more
details of the debacle. The TSA also declared that "details about
future breaches also would be kept secret because of national
security," The Dallas Morning News reported. The Fort
Worth Star-Telegram added: "Too much information was made public
about the breach, local TSA officials have been told. Further
disclosures by airport officials or anyone else privy to the final
report could result in fines and/or jail time."
While some people may retain hope that
the preceding fiascoes are merely birth pangs, contrary evidence
continues to cascade in:
・瘢雹On February 6, 2003,
according to Airport Security Report, San Francisco
International Airport was disrupted after a Taiwanese woman with two
carry-on bags "sprinted through an unmanned security checkpoint at
10:46 a.m. It wasn稚 until 1 p.m. that TSA officials evacuated
the terminal." TSA agents looked for the woman, concluded she was "lost
in the crowd," and then spent time reviewing the videotape of the
security checkpoint before ordering an evacuation and rescreening.
・瘢雹On March 8, 2003, a terminal
at the Hartford, Connecticut, airport was evacuated after a screener
was caught taking a late afternoon nap by an X-ray machine.
・瘢雹On March 11, 2003, according
to Airport Security Report, TSA officials shut down the
Birmingham, Alabama, international airport after "four people were
discovered lurking on the airport tarmac. They fled on foot when
officers questioned them about their badges identifying them as airport
security workers." Dozens of flights were delayed and hundreds of
people were evacuated before it was learned that the four suspicious
individuals were TSA officials testing airport security.
・瘢雹On March 21, 2003, Cleveland
Hopkins International Airport was placed under a 40-minute lockdown,
prohibiting all passenger entries or exits and all plane departures.
TSA agents hit the alarm when they spotted a little toy gun on a
child痴 belt buckle in a carry-on bag.
The TSA confiscated the child痴 belt buckle. Spokesman
Rick DeChant announced, "Had Mom or Dad helped this kid pack, this
[airport lockdown] could have been avoided."
・瘢雹On April 3, 2003, a
passenger at Baltimore-Washington International airport refused to be
rescreened after the metal detector signaled an alarm from her first
pass. Instead, she walked on to her flight. Although two concourses
were closed for an hour, the woman was never apprehended.
・瘢雹In May 2003 Americans
learned that the TSA had fired scores of screeners who had been on the
job for several months in Los Angeles and New York after finding that
they had criminal records. The Los Angeles Times reported that
the agency "lost background questionnaires, failed to run some employee
fingerprints through a national crime database and was unable to
complete background checks." The Times noted that congressmen
began investigating the TSA痴 "background check process after
reports that a screener at Kennedy airport was arrested earlier this
year for allegedly stealing $6,000 from a passenger." At Dulles
International Airport in Washington, D.C., the agency failed to
complete background checks on more than a third of the 600 screeners.
One employee complained: "It defeats the purpose of what you are here
for. It痴 a 200-plus [person] security breach." Nationwide, more
than 20,000 TSA screeners were on the job even though the government
had not completed background checks on them.
One reason for the federal takeover of
airport security, you may recall, is that private companies had hired
screeners of dubious character and poor trustworthiness.
On March 10, 2003, a TSA press release
proudly announced, "The Transportation Security Administration has
intercepted more than 4.8 million prohibited items at passenger
security checkpoints in its first year, contributing to the security of
the traveling public and the nation痴 429 commercial airports."
Agency chief James Loy bragged that "those statistics are strong
testimony to the professionalism and attention to detail of our highly
trained security screeners." A few weeks later, he upped the ante,
informing the House Appropriations Committee: "We have identified,
intercepted, and therefore kept off aircraft more than 4.8 million dangerous
items."
And so all the fingernail clippers and
cigar cutters seized since 9/11 transmogrified into proof that the
federal government is protecting people better than ever. The press
release did not mention that the checkpoint seizures included frying
pans, dumbbell sets, horseshoes, toy robots, and an unknown but huge
number of small pointy objects.
Security as Theater
Here痴 a more sobering measure of
the agency痴 effectiveness: The New York Daily News celebrated
the first anniversary of 9/11 by sending two reporters around the
country, taking 14 flights on six airlines, and passing through 11
major airports during Labor Day weekend 2002. The reporters carried box
cutters, razors, knives, and pepper spray in their luggage. They took
their contraband through the checkpoints at all four of the airports
used by the hijackers on 9/11. "Not a single airport security
checkpoint spotted or confiscated any of the dangerous items, all of
which have been banned from airports and planes by federal
authorities," the paper revealed. The reporters were selected for hand
searches several times, but even then nothing was found. There were
more security personnel and searches than a year before, "but it
amounted to nothing more than a big show."
The TSA blamed the failures on its
prehistory, commenting that the Daily News・瘢雹findings
"underscore the failures of an aviation security system inherited by
the federal government last fall." A spokesman for Department of
Transportation Secretary Mineta, Leonard Alcivar, greeted the findings
with a spurt of positive thinking: "The reality is Americans have never
had a higher level of security in the history of aviation."
There was less room for positive
thinking a year later, when college student Nathaniel Heatwole pulled a
similar stunt, planting box cutters and fake bombs on six different
planes to probe the gaps in security. In September 2003 he sent the TSA
an e-mail message explaining what he had done, in the hope of sparking
improvements in the system. Instead he was brought up on charges and
now faces up to 10 years in jail.
There is no series of tricks or reforms
that will guarantee safe air travel. But a first step toward better
security is to recognize the facades the feds have created. The TSA
should no longer be permitted to burden travelers or taxpayers. The
armies of federal agents occupying American airports should be
disbanded. In the meantime, airports and airlines must not be shielded
from liability if their negligence results in carnage. The specter of
devastating liability lawsuits could produce more innovations and
sounder security policies than the incentives produced by Washington
political circuses.
Federal intelligence agencies should do
a better job of notifying airports and airlines of specific current
threats. Resources should be focused on determining actual threats,
rather than treating every grandmother and toddler as a potential
hijacker. And it would be helpful to amend U.S. foreign policy to
reduce the number of foreigners willing to kill themselves to slaughter
Americans.
In the wake of 9/11, the federal
mentality toward air travelers is best summarized by the motto posted
at the headquarters of the TSA air marshal training center: "Dominate.
Intimidate. Control." But it takes more than browbeating average
Americans to make air travel safe.

James Bovard is the author of Terrorism
and Tyranny: Trampling Freedom, Justice, and Peace to Rid the World of
Evil (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), from which this article is adapted.
TSA Steals Cigars
Oooo am I mad! Maybe someone from the TSA saw my rant two
weeks ago on inconsistant security standards and decided to get even.
During my regular Monday commute from Seattle to San Jose via Alaska
Airlines flight 344, someone stole a portable cigar case from my
checked bag. The case, a gift from my wife, was carrying 2 Cohiba
Robusto's and 2 Hemmingway Short Stories - about $100 worth of smokes.
Interestingly enough, I know that the TSA (motto: “Respecting
Privacy, Preserving Freedoms“) opened up the bag - they put
a blue tie on the zipper and enclosed a “Notifcation of Baggage
Inspection” leaflet. Which reads:
“During the inspection, your bag and its contents may have
been searched for prohibited items.” I wonder if someone
thought the Cohiba's were Cuban and decided to play Customs
Inspector. Then I read, “At the completion of the
inspection, the contents were returned to your bag, which was
resealed.” NOT!
The leaflet gives a toll-free number, 866-289-9673 for the TSE
Consumer Response Center. Well, it's just a recording telling you
to go to the web site (www.tsa.gov)
to download a claim form. You can leave a message with your
address though. Which I did. The page to make a claim
directs me to call the Consumer Response Center, which in turn directs
me to the web site. Ugh. The only privacy being protected
is that of the thief's.
I'm thinking that while my cigars were being lifted, the TSA
(remember our motto - “Respecting
Privacy, Preserving Freedoms“) was making me wait 15 minutes
in a line, then suffer the indignity of making me undress by having me
take off my shoes, jacket and unpack my briefcase.
Another page indicates that valuables shouldn't be in checked
baggage. They think the airlines are to blame however;
“The air carriers retain possession of your checked baggage for
the entire trip with the exception of a short period of time while it
is screened by the TSA.”
Of course, it's during that “short period” where my
bag actually gets opened up by TSA folks. How else would someone
know the cigars are in there? It's not like they show up on a
X-ray and a baggage handler goes - “hey, let's nab that
one.”
FYI, if I felt that the TSA was truly helping America be a safer
place, I'd be more understanding.
US
9/11 Families Blast TSA for Excessive Secrecy, Abuse of Power
Author: 9/11 Families United to Bankrupt Terrorism
Published on Mar 14, 2006, 07:14
Charging the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) with
wrongfully denying them access to documents once in the public domain,
the 9/11 Families United to Bankrupt Terrorism today called on Congress
to force TSA to change its practices on classifying materials as
"Sensitive Security Information" (SSI).
"Why has TSA provided documents to attorneys for an admitted terrorist,
Zacarias Moussaoui, but denied them to us?" asked Julie Sweeney Roth of
Yarmouthport, Mass., whose husband, Brian Sweeney, was a passenger on
United flight 175. "Whose side is TSA on?"
"The truth is our most powerful weapon in the war on terrorism," said
Alice Hoglan of Los Gatos, California, mother of Mark Bingham, one of
the United flight 93 passengers who charged the hijackers and prevented
the airplane from being crashed into either the Capitol or the White
House. Contending that TSA would be fulfilling its responsibility to
protect the nation's transportation system by releasing the information
the families are requesting, Hoglan said, "It was because my son and
his fellow passengers learned the truth about the hijackers' intentions
that they were able to save countless lives as their final, brave act.
That is why I am outraged that TSA is trying to hide the truth and
making Americans less safe."
"SSI should have a different acronym -- CYA," said Dr. Stephen Alderman
of Bedford, N.Y., whose son, Peter Alderman, died at the World Trade
Center. "The materials we're requesting deal with pre-9/11 security
procedures that have changed, making them of no use to would-be
terrorists. Some aired on national television and were published in
newspapers. TSA's only conceivable motive is avoiding embarrassment or
protecting the airlines."
Sweeney Roth, Dr. Alderman, and his wife, Elizabeth, are among a group
of 9/11 family members meeting with members of Congress today as part
of an effort to educate U.S. senators and representatives about the
problems at TSA and to change TSA's SSI practices.
Congress created the SSI designation to enable TSA to prevent the
release of information that the agency determines presents a threat to
the nation's transportation system. The 9/11 Families made clear that
they are not challenging TSA's right to withhold information that could
present a genuine security threat. Instead, they charged that TSA is
abusing its authority by stamping as SSI and keeping secret a host of
materials that clearly pose no threat whatsoever -- including many
documents once openly available but now shrouded in secrecy.
TSA's classification of these documents and its insistence that its SSI
decisions are essentially unreviewable brazenly violate the intent of
Congress, the families charged. They cited a June 2005 report from the
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Congress' investigative arm,
blasting TSA for its failure to implement adequate policies, guidance,
procedures, internal controls and training regarding the SSI process.
Though TSA claims to have subsequently set in place a structure for
reviewing SSI, the agency has still failed to offer any guidelines by
which it trains its employees to determine what is and is not SSI,
despite many congressional requests.
The 9/11 Families charged that many of TSA's SSI classifications "are
so absurd, they turn real life into satire." For example:
* When the videotape showing hijackers passing through security at
Washington Dulles airport on 9/11 was aired on NBC, TSA issued a
two-line press release boasting that it "strongly validates the
dramatic changes that TSA has made in the world of aviation security."
Now, TSA has classified the tape as SSI. Yet TSA itself released a
similar videotape showing lead hijacker Mohammed Atta passing through
security at the airport in Portland, Maine, on 9/11.
* TSA has taken material that has long been in the public domain --
including information published in the Congressional Record and major
newspapers -- and labeled it SSI.
* TSA has classified as SSI the five Federal Aviation Administration
warnings to the airlines issued in the months before 9/11, despite the
fact that they were quoted in the 9/11 Commission's report and
discussed in public testimony.
The 9/11 Families also noted that TSA's policies resulted in the
dismissal of charges against a baggage handler, who had been caught
stealing from a passenger's luggage, because TSA labeled incriminating
materials as SSI and refused to turn them over to the Court.
The 9/11 Families are urging Congress to compel TSA to fulfill the
families' requests for access to pre-9/11 documents and materials that
were once publicly available. They noted that a House Appropriations
Subcommittee wrote last year that it "expects the Department to try to
release as much, not as little, information to the public as possible"
and that U.S. District Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein said from the bench
that TSA's conduct in reviewing SSI "is cruel and inhuman to the people
involved."
Some of the 9/11 Families are plaintiffs in litigation against the
airlines and are seeking documents withheld by TSA, but others who are
not are joining the effort to educate Congress about TSA's abuse of its
authority to keep information secret. "This is a matter of principle,"
said Hoglan, who settled with the Victims' Compensation Fund and thus
cannot sue the airlines. "It's about our right to know the truth about
why our loved ones were killed. It's about protecting our democracy and
our system of checks and balances."
The 9/11 Families United to Bankrupt Terrorism represents 6,161
survivors and family members of those who died in the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks. The 9/11 Families are seeking to hold al
Qaeda's financiers accountable for their central role in these
atrocities and to make America safer by cutting off the financial
pipeline fueling global terrorism.
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| Security
Screener at JFK Airport Charged with Stealing $80,000 from Checked Bag |
Posted by:
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TSA spokeswoman Ann Davis: "TSA has a
zero-tolerance policy for theft in the workplace."
A security employee at John F. Kennedy International Airport was
charged Thursday with stealing $80,000 in cash from a checked suitcase
headed for Pakistan, the Queens district attorney's office said.
The Transportation Security Administration screener, Frank Ulerio, Jr.,
23, allegedly stole the money when he was inspecting checked luggage on
Oct. 7 in a Pakistan International Airlines area at the airport.
Prosecutors said he stole the cash from the suitcase of a 45-year-old
passenger from Astoria, Queens who was flying to Pakistan.
...
When confronted, Ulerio admitted stealing $60,000
and said he used some of it to pay off a gambling debt. Police
recovered $18,000 when he was arrested at work Wednesday.
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